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assets in inventory. See 11 U.S.C. 546(c)(1) (2012).6  Thus, a vendor’s right to reclaim becomes 
“subordinated to the secured creditor’s claim.”7  
Consequently, section 546(c)(1) is often invoked by a debtor or trustee as a “Prior Lien 
Defense” to effectively bar relief on a vendor’s reclamation claim.8  Recognizing the statutory 
priority of senior secured lenders to reclaiming vendors, a number of courts presiding over 
reclamation claims have made reclamation the “most illusory of remedies” in bankruptcy 
practice, providing little or no protection for vendors of goods from insolvent buyers.9 
 There are two scenarios in the context of reclamation that warrant distinction.  The first is 
where a debtor procures a loan prior to purchasing goods on credit from a vendor.  The second is 
where a debtor first purchases goods on credit and subsequently procures a loan.  The distinction 
is significant because it speaks to the priority of reclamation rights as against the competing 
claims of secured creditors.  The first scenario presents a situation where, assuming the creditor 
received a security interest in the debtor’s assets, the vendor’s reclamation claim would yield 
priority to the creditor’s claim as it arose after the creditor obtained a security interest.  However, 
the second scenario presents a situation where the vendor’s reclamation claim would take 
priority over a secured creditor’s claim as it arose prior to the debtor’s granting of the creditor’s 
security interest. 
                                                
6 Section 546(c)(1) provides that, “[S]ubject to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in such 
goods or the proceeds thereof, the rights and powers of the trustee . . . are subject to the right of a seller of 
goods that has sold goods to the debtor, in the ordinary course of the seller’s business, to reclaim such 
goods if the debtor has received such goods while insolvent[.]” 
7 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 546.04[2][b][vii] (16th ed. rev. 2015). 
8 See, e.g., In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The Debtors also asserted that 
certain legal defenses to the reclamation claims based upon the existence of prior liens on the goods to be 
reclaimed (collectively, the ‘Prior Lien Defense’) rendered all of the reclamation claims valueless.”).   
9 Deborah L. Thorne, The Courts Begin to Speak: Deciphering §546(c), 26-APR, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 38 
(2007). 
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 The presence of both pre- and post-petition creditors can further complicate a bankruptcy 
case in this context.  This memo focused on the issue of determining the priority of a reclamation 
claim as against that of a post-petition creditor, particularly where the proceeds of post-petition 
financing are used to repay prepetition debt.  The courts are split in their analyses of this issue; 
one camp taking a lender-favored approach that subordinates reclamation claims to the liens of 
post-petition lenders, and the other a vendor-favored approach that preserves the right to 
reclamation despite the presence of a post-petition lender with a security interest in the goods 
sought to be reclaimed. 
I. The Issue of Reclamation Rights as Against a Post-Petition DIP Lender and the 
Resulting Circuit Split 
 
 Courts have considered the validity or value of reclamation claims as against a post-
petition debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender holding blanket liens on inventory, as opposed to a 
pre-petition lender holding similar liens.10  A DIP lender may be treated differently in this 
instance due to the temporal nature of the DIP financing.11  The precise issue, as addressed by the 
courts in Dairy Mart, Dana Corp., Phar-Mor, and most recently, Reichhold, asks whether a DIP 
lender’s subsequently perfected security interest defeats a vendor’s reclamation rights when the 
proceeds from the DIP loan are used to satisfy the debtor’s prepetition loan.12  
 Courts have taken either one of two approaches in determining whether a DIP lender’s 
subsequently granted lien on goods defeats a vendor’s reclamation rights in those goods.  The 
                                                
10 See In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores Inc., 302 B.R. 128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also In re 
Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409; In re Phar-Mor, 301 B.R. 482 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003), aff’d 534 F.3d 502 
(6th Cir. 2008); In re Reichhold Holdings US, Inc., 556 B.R. 107 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
11 In this context, a DIP lender is defined as a post-petition creditor who provides financing to a debtor in 
bankruptcy after a vendor has delivered goods. See John D. Ayer, Johnathan P. Friedland, & Michael L. 
Bernstein, Obtaining DIP Financing and Using Cash Collateral, 23-SEP, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 16 (2004) 
(explaining that debtor-in-possession financing is also known as post-petition lending). 
12 See In re Dairy Mart, 302 B.R. at 135; see also In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 418; see also In re Phar-
Mor, 534 F.3d at 503; see also In re Reichhold Holdings US, Inc., 556 B.R. at 110–11. 
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result is a split amongst the respective decisions.  The analysis employed by the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of New York in Dairy Mart and Dana Corp., reflects a lender-
favored approach.13  In contrast, the analysis employed by the Sixth Circuit in Phar-Mor and by 
the Bankruptcy Court in Delaware in Reichhold, reflects a vendor-favored approach.14  
I. The Competing Approaches Expanded 
 
A. New York’s Approach: What is an “Integrated Transaction?” 
 
The analysis of an “integrated transaction” approach begins with In re Dairy Mart 
Convenience Stores Inc.15  In that case, the debtor’s prepetition lender had a lien on prepetition 
assets, including the goods that reclaiming vendors sought to reclaim.16  Through the proceeds of 
its DIP loan, the debtor satisfied the prepetition lender’s claim in full, thus releasing the lien.  
The debtor then granted the DIP lender an identical security interest in prepetition assets.17 
Ultimately, the Dairy Mart court held that where a prepetition secured lender held a lien 
on inventory and was subsequently paid from the proceeds of a DIP loan supported by a new 
floating lien, the inventory securing the prepetition debt was effectively used to satisfy that 
debt.18  Despite the post-petition lien being granted after the vendors’ reclamation rights arose, it 
                                                
13 See In re Dairy Mart, 302 B.R. at 136 (holding that “Reclamation Claims were rendered valueless 
because the proceeds from the disposition of the reclamation goods were used to satisfy [the pre-petition 
lender’s] secured claim.”); see also In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 421 (holding that “[T]he Reclamation 
claims [were] valueless as the goods remained subject to the Prior Lien Defense.”). 
14 See In re Phar-Mor, 534 F.3d at 503 (holding that a vendor’s reclamation right is not extinguished 
“when the goods subject to reclamation are sold and the proceeds used to satisfy a secured creditor’s 
superior claim.”); In re Reichhold US Inc., 556 B.R. at 111 (holding that where a pre-petition loan was 
paid from the proceeds of a DIP loan, the prepetition lender’s lien was satisfied, but the vendor’s 
reclamation rights remained in force.). 
15 302 B.R. 128.   
16 Id. at 130–31. 
17 Id. at 131. 
18 Id. at 136. 
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was related back to the prepetition lien as an “integrated transaction,” thus rendering the 
reclamation claims valueless.19  
Relying on the approach used in Dairy Mart, the court in In re Dana Corp.,20 under 
similar facts, held that the secured lenders’ liens had priority over the claimant-vendors.  The 
Dana Corp. Court reasoned that because the post-petition lender’s loan proceeds were used to 
pay the prepetition loan and the DIP lender subsequently obtained a lien against the debtor’s 
inventory, then that lien took priority over an intervening seller’s reclamation claim against that 
inventory.21  Consequently, the reclamation claims were rendered valueless.22 
B. The Sixth Circuit and Reichhold: Skepticism of the “Integrated Transaction” 
Approach 
 
Decided in the same year as Dairy Mart, In re Phar-Mor explicitly rejected the notion of 
an integrated transaction.23  Again, in the context of post-petition DIP financing used to satisfy 
prepetition debt, the Sixth Circuit in Phar-Mor affirmed that a DIP Lender’s subsequently 
granted lien on inventory did not relate back to the prepetition lender’s lien, but created an 
entirely new lien subject to a vendor’s valid reclamation right.24  The Bankruptcy Court in that 
case explained, “[a] debtor’s decision to grant a security interest in inventory to a subsequent 
                                                
19 Id. at 135-36 (“The transaction releasing Citizen’s [prepetition] lien and simultaneously granting the 
lien to the post-petition lender, Foothill, must be viewed as an integrated transaction.”). 
20 367 B.R. 409. 
21 See id. at 421 (“The DIP Lien granted to the DIP Lenders . . . provided a security interest in, and lien 
upon, all of the collateral constituting the prepetition collateral [including reclaimed goods].  Thus the lien 
chain continued unbroken.”). 
22 Id. 
23 See In re Phar-Mor, 301 B.R. 482. 
24 Id. at 507-08 (“We find that Ohio Rev.Code § 1302.76(B) (UCC 2-702(2)) grants a properly reclaiming 
vendor . . . a right to reclaim its goods and that § 1302.76(C) (UCC 2-702(3)) does not allow a secured 
creditor’s claim to defeat that right.”). 
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secured lender cannot defeat a seller’s reclamation rights before the security interest is 
granted.”25  
It is Phar-Mor that ultimately informs the more recent decision by the Delaware 
Bankruptcy Court in In re Reichhold Holdings US, Inc.26  The Reichhold Court, in analyzing 
whether a DIP Lender’s blanket lien in inventory, granted after a vendor’s reclamation rights 
arose, related back to the prepetition lender’s rights and corresponding lien, explained that “when 
the Prepetition Loan was repaid from the DIP loan, the Prepetition Lender’s lien was satisfied 
but [the vendor’s] reclamation rights remained in force.”27  The court explained, “The fact that 
funds obtained from the DIP Loan were used to satisfy the Prepetition Loan, or that the Debtor 
granted the DIP Lenders a lien in inventory to obtain such funds, is irrelevant.”28  It is worth 
noting the Reichhold Court’s emphasis on the nature of a lien as it relates to the distinct security 
interests of pre- and post-petition lenders against reclamation claims. The court further noted, 
“[t]he function of a lien is to secure a debt; once that debt is repaid, the lien and the rights of the 
lien-holder terminate.”29  
Viewing the two liens as separate and distinct, the court in Reichhold declined to find an 
“integrated transaction” where the proceeds of a DIP loan were used to satisfy prepetition debt, 
and the reclaimed goods were used to secure that loan.  There merely existed two different 
transactions with “two different loans by two different lenders at two different times.”30  This 
logic rests on temporal grounds and the notion of when in time particular rights arose.  
                                                
25 Id. at 497. 
26 556 B.R. 107. 
27 Id. at 111. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (citing Unisys Fin. Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 979 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1992)) (“A lien is 
parasitic on a claim. If the lien disappears—poof! The lien is gone.”). 
30 Reichhold, 556 B.R. at 112. 
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Covestro’s reclamation rights came into existence before the DIP Lenders’ lien attached, and 
further, that lien was “expressly subject to reclamation rights under section 546.”31 
Conclusion 
There is still a great deal of uncertainty surrounding reclamation rights under section 
546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 2-702 of the UCC.32  As illustrated by the circuit split 
regarding this issue, whether or not the reclamation rights under section 546(c) retain their 
priority against a post-petition lender depends on the circumstances as well as the analytical 
approach adopted by the court in question.33  
 
 
                                                
31 Id. at 111. 
32 See Ryan J. Works & Amanda M. Perach, Holding On to Reclamation Rights under In re Reichhold 
Holdings, 36-JAN, AM. BANKR. J., 14 (2017) (“[T]he recent decision in Reichhold Holdings indicates that 
this area of law is simply premature and will likely be the subject of litigation for years to come.”). 
33 See id.; Compare In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409 and In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores Inc., 302 
B.R. 128, with In re Phar-Mor Inc., 301 B.R. 482 and In re Reichhold Holdings US, Inc., 556 B.R. 107 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
